Menachem Začnite na vrhu v Camp Davidu

Menachem Začnite na vrhu v Camp Davidu


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Ob zaključku vrha v Camp Davidu je izraelski premier Menachem Begin 17. septembra 1978 imel govor, v katerem se je zahvalil predsedniku Jimmyju Carterju, ki je pomagal pri pogajanjih o prvi mirovni pogodbi med Izraelom in arabskim narodom.


Camp Davidovi sporazumi

Predsednik Jimmy Carter s egiptovskim predsednikom Anvarjem Sadatom in izraelskim premierjem Menachemom Beginom je napovedal ...

Camp Davidovi sporazumi

Jody Powell, tiskovna sekretarka uprave Carterja, je govorila o tem, kako so bili doseženi sporazumi v Camp Davidu.…

CBS News Preiskava, Warrenovo poročilo, 4. del

Poizvedba CBS News: Warrenovo poročilo je štiridelna serija iz junija 1967, ki preučuje polemike glede ugotovitev Warrenove komisije, ki je bila ...

20. obletnica dogovora Camp Davida

20. obletnico mirovnega sporazuma v Camp Davidu je zaznamoval forum na Univerzi v Marylandu. Nekdanji…


Mornariški administrator Michael Giorgione vam daje redek videz ‘V notranjosti Camp David ’

Če se želite odpraviti na zelo redek izlet v zgodovino in delovanje enega najbolj skrivnostnih in mogočnih krajev na Zemlji, vas upokojeni mornariški admiral Michael Giorgione, nekdanji poveljnik Camp Davida, pripelje tik pred vhodna vrata.

Giorgione v svoji knjigi "Inside Camp David" prinaša neverjeten notranji pogled na ameriški predsedniški umik Camp David.

“V notranjosti Camp David ” kontraadmiral Michael Giorgione CEC, USN (Ret.) (Fotografija z dovoljenjem zadnjega admirala Michael Giorgione)

Giorgione bralcem vpogleda v zasebno življenje 13 predsednikov in njihovih družin, ki so skozi svojo 75-letno zgodovino obiskali Camp David, skupaj z izkušnjami 18 od 24 častnikov mornarice, ki so tam služili kot poveljniki. Rezultat daje sliko o tem, kakšno je bilo življenje v Camp Davidu, in osvetljuje osrednji značaj predsedstva in Amerike.

Camp David je umik države za predsednika ZDA. Nahaja se v gozdnatih hribih približno 62 milj & dve uri in pol vožnje — severovzhodno od Washingtona, DC, v gorskem parku Catoctin blizu Thurmonta, Md.

Predsednik Barack Obama se z osebjem sprehodi do Laurel Cabin pred začetkom delovnega zasedanja vrha skupine G8 v Camp Davidu, Md, 19. maja 2012. S predsednikom se od leve sprehodijo: načelnik generalštaba Jack Lew Ben Rhodes, namestnik državnega predstavnika Varnostni svetovalec za strateška komuniciranja Mike Froman, namestnik svetovalca za nacionalno varnost za mednarodne in gospodarske zadeve ter svetovalec za nacionalno varnost Tom Donilon. (Uradna fotografija Bele hiše Pete Souza)

Giorgione nam daje vpogled v najzgodnejše dni tega, kar naj bi postalo Camp David. Citira predsednika Franklina Delana Roosevelta, ki si je najprej ogledal mesto prihodnjega predsedniškega umika in izjavil: “To je moj Shangri-La. ” Osebno se je zanimal za vse podrobnosti razvoja taborišča. Vsak predsednik je od takrat pustil svoj osebni pečat. S prostim očesom je zaklenjena varnost, primerljiva z varnostjo Bele hiše, hkrati pa zagotavlja sproščen, gozdnat občutek poletnega tabora ”, ki so ga nekateri predsedniki imenovali "pretiho".

Šahovska igra med premierjem Menachemom Beginom in svetovalcem za nacionalno varnost ZDA Zbigniewom Brzezinskim v Camp Davidu med mirovnimi pogajanji med Izraelom in Egiptom leta 1978. (Tiskovni urad izraelske vlade/objavljeno)

Spletno mesto je leta 1935 ustanovila Uprava za napredek pri delu (WPA), prvotno pa ga je predsednik Roosevelt poimenoval “Shangri-La ”, vendar ga je predsednik Eisenhower leta 1953 preimenoval v Camp David v čast svojega vnuka. Uradno znan kot Naval Support Facility Thurmont, v njem so v celoti zaposleni častniki mornarice in mornarice, podčastniki in vpoklicano osebje.

Giorgione, stotnik med svojo nalogo v Camp Davidu, je poveljeval osebju izključno moških in žensk mornarice in mornarice ZDA. Medtem ko so bili člani njegovega osebja skrbno izbrani za to najprestižnejšo nalogo, večina ni imela predhodnih izkušenj pri opravljanju številnih nalog, ki so jih morali poklicati v Camp David. Njegovo vrhunsko vodstvo je navdihnilo vrhunsko zmogljivost, prilagodljivost, prilagodljivost in, kar je najpomembneje, timsko delo za spopadanje s številnimi nepredvidenimi izrednimi razmerami in izzivi.

Predsednik Kennedy, sin John F. Kennedy, Jr., in hči Caroline Bouvier Kennedy v Camp Davidu v Marylandu 31. marca 1963. (Robert Knudsen, Bela hiša / predsedniška knjižnica in muzej John F. Kennedy)

Giorgione nam daje obsežno zgodovino do prvih dni tega, kar je postalo Camp David. Osebno se je zanimal za vse podrobnosti razvoja tabora in od takrat je vsak predsednik ZDA pustil svoj osebni pečat.

Osebni pečat ” tega, kar je Camp David pomenil za vsakega predsednika, je očitno v besedah ​​Giorgioneja. Bil je Franklin Roosevelt in#8217s Shangri-La. Lyndonu Johnsonu je bilo to le še eno delovno mesto. ” John Kennedy je našel prostor za posebno zabavo s svojo družino. Richard Nixon “ je oblikoval Camp David, da bi zadovoljil njegove potrebe, tabor pa je odražal njegovo razpoloženje. ” Gerald Ford je spletno mesto uporabljal za nego svoje prve dame, Betty, po večji operaciji. Za Jimmyja Carterja je bilo to mesto njegovega največjega dosežka, Camp David Accords. Za Ronalda Reagana je bilo to mesto “ kjer bi lahko bil mož in oseba po lastnih pogojih. ”

Predsednik Lyndon B. Johnson je imel veliko konferenc v Camp Davidu. Tu uživa v lahkem trenutku, ko se je marca 1965. pogovarjal z obrambnim ministrom Robertom McNamaro in državnim sekretarjem Deanom Ruskom (Johnsonova knjižnica/izšlo)

Tabor je služil kot družinski umik za Busha 41. Bill Clinton “ je našel načine, da se prilagodi njegovi osebnosti ”, in se ogrel v taborišče, kjer se je še posebej zbližal s tamkajšnjimi marinci in mornarji. George W. Bush je družinsko ljubezen in med počitnicami preživljal dolge ure po telefonu, ko se je pogovarjal s četami v tujini. ” Barack Obama “ se je najbolj približal temu, da bi postal tabor za ljudi in#8217. '&# 8221

Predsednik Harry Truman je bil edini predsednik, ki je redko uporabljal Camp David, ker je njegova žena to imenovala dolgočasno. ”

Predsednik Bush igra tenis v dvojicah s Chrisom Evertom, Davidom Batesom in Tutom Bartzenom v Camp Davidu, 4. avgusta 1990.
(Predsedniška knjižnica Georgea Busha/izšlo)

Čeprav tabor ponuja predsedniku in njegovi družini priložnost za samoto in mir, je služil kot gostitelj tujim voditeljem in državnim zadevam. Daleč stran od javnosti in tiska je Camp David gostil in bo še naprej gostil nekatere najpomembnejše svetovne razprave in odločitve med svetovnimi voditelji – od boja proti drugi svetovni vojni do sporazuma na Bližnjem vzhodu, podpisanega leta 1978 v Camp Davidu. .

V Camp Davidu ni nič dolgočasnega in Giorgione ujame veličino tega delnega urada, delnega umika za najmočnejše voditelje sveta.


Menachem Begin

Menachem Begin (rojen 1913 v Brestu, umrl 1992 v Tel Avivu), (1977-1983), ugledni politik, izraelski premier (1977–1983) in Anwar Al-sadat (1918–1981), predsednik Egipta (1970- 1981), počaščen za mirovna pogajanja v Camp Davidu.

Menachem Begin se je pri 18 letih (medtem ko je živel na novo neodvisni Poljski) pridružil paravojaški cionistični mladinski organizaciji Betar in kmalu postal eden njenih vodilnih aktivistov. Leta 1940 ga je NKVD aretiral in poslal v Sibirijo. Z vojsko generala Andersa mu je uspelo zapustiti Sovjetsko zvezo in prispeti v Palestino. Kmalu zatem je postal vodja tajne organizacije Irgun, ki se je borila proti Arabcem in uprizarjala teroristične napade na britanske oblasti v Palestini.

Ko je bila leta 1948 ustanovljena država Izrael, je Begin zavrnil načelo delitve Palestine, ki ga je predstavil njegov politični tekmec David Ben-Gurion, vodja stranke Mapai (laburisti). Irgun se je preoblikoval v politično stranko (Herut), ki je pod vodstvom Begina postala priljubljena, zlasti med revnejšimi družbenimi sloji.

Leta 1970 je Begin zapustil vlado narodne enotnosti in postal vodja Likuda, zavezništva vseh desnih strank. Leta 1977, potem ko je stranka Mapai izgubila na volitvah, je Begin postal predsednik vlade. V Jeruzalemu je potekalo zgodovinsko srečanje z egiptovskim predsednikom Anvarjem Sadatom, ki je-ob sodelovanju ameriškega predsednika Jimmyja Carterja-pripeljalo do podpisa Camp Davidovega sporazuma septembra 1978 in egiptovsko-izraelske mirovne pogodbe 26. Marca 1979, čemur je sledil umik izraelskih vojakov s Sinajskega polotoka. Po drugi strani je julija 1980 vlada Begina odobrila priključitev vzhodnega Jeruzalema, decembra 1981 pa Golanske visoravni, zajetih od Sircev.

Po nekaj srčnih napadih in smrti žene Alise je Begin 29. avgusta 1983 odstopil s funkcije in se umaknil iz javnega življenja. Do smrti je živel sam.


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Vsebina

Ameriški predsednik Bill Clinton je 5. julija 2000 objavil povabilo izraelskemu premierju Ehudu Baraku in Yasserju Arafatu, da prideta v Camp David v Marylandu, da nadaljujeta pogajanja o bližnjevzhodnem mirovnem procesu. V Camp Davidovem sporazumu iz leta 1978 je bil upanje primeren, kjer je predsednik Jimmy Carter lahko sklenil mirovni sporazum med Egiptom, ki ga je zastopal predsednik Anwar Sadat, in Izraelom, ki ga je zastopal premier Menachem Begin. Sporazum iz Osla leta 1993 med pozneje umorjenim izraelskim premierjem Yitzhakom Rabinom in predsednikom Palestinske osvobodilne organizacije Yasserjem Arafatom je določil, da je treba v vseh petih letih doseči dogovor o vseh odprtih vprašanjih med Palestinci in izraelsko stranjo-tako imenovani dogovor o končnem statusu izvajanja palestinske avtonomije. Vendar vmesni proces, uveden pod Oslom, ni izpolnil niti izraelskih niti palestinskih pričakovanj.

11. julija se je sklical vrh Camp David 2000, čeprav so Palestinci menili, da je vrh predčasen. [5] Videli so ga celo kot past. [6] Vrh se je končal 25. julija brez dogovora. Ob zaključku je bila izdana tristranska izjava, ki opredeljuje dogovorjena načela, ki bodo vodila prihodnja pogajanja. [7]

Pogajanja so temeljila na pristopu vse ali nič, tako da "nič ni veljalo za dogovorjeno in zavezujoče, dokler ni vse dogovorjeno". Predlogi so bili večinoma ustni. Ker ni bil dosežen dogovor in ni uradnih pisnih zapisov o predlogih, ostaja nekaj nejasnosti glede podrobnosti stališč strank do posebnih vprašanj. [8]

Pogovori na koncu niso dosegli dogovora o vprašanjih končnega statusa:

Ozemlje

Palestinski pogajalci so nakazali, da želijo popolno palestinsko suverenost nad celotnim Zahodnim bregom in Gazo, čeprav bi razmišljali o zamenjavi zemljišč ena proti ena z Izraelom. Njihovo zgodovinsko stališče je bilo, da so Palestinci že sklenili ozemeljski kompromis z Izraelom, tako da so sprejeli pravico Izraela do 78% "zgodovinske Palestine" in sprejeli njihovo državo na preostalih 22% take zemlje. To soglasje je izrazil Faisal Husseini, ko je pripomnil: "Pri kompromisu ne more biti kompromisa". [9] Trdili so, da Resolucija 242 poziva k popolnemu umiku Izraela s teh ozemelj, zajetih v šestdnevni vojni, kot del končne mirovne rešitve. V sporazumu iz Osla leta 1993 so palestinski pogajalci sprejeli meje Zelene črte (premirje iz leta 1949) za Zahodni breg, vendar so Izraelci ta predlog zavrnili in izpodbijali palestinsko razlago Resolucije 242. Izrael je hotel priključiti številne bloke naselij na palestinski strani zeleno črto in so bili zaskrbljeni, da je popolna vrnitev na meje iz leta 1967 nevarna za varnost Izraela. Palestinska in izraelska definicija Zahodnega brega se razlikujeta za približno 5% kopenske površine, saj izraelska opredelitev ne vključuje Vzhodnega Jeruzalema (71 km 2), teritorialnih voda Mrtvega morja (195 km 2) in območja, znanega kot Nikogaršnja Zemljišče (50 km 2 pri Latrunu). [8]

Na podlagi izraelske definicije Zahodnega brega je Barak ponudil oblikovanje palestinske države na začetku na 73% Zahodnega brega (to je 27% manj kot meje zelene črte) in 100% Gaze. V 10–25 letih bi se palestinska država razširila na največ 92% Zahodnega brega (91 odstotkov Zahodnega brega in 1 odstotek iz zamenjave zemljišč). [8] [10] S palestinskega vidika je to pomenilo ponudbo palestinske države na največ 86% Zahodnega brega. [8]

Po podatkih judovske virtualne knjižnice bi se Izrael umaknil iz 63 naselij. [11] Po mnenju Roberta Wrighta bi Izrael obdržal le naselja z velikim številom prebivalcev. Wright navaja, da bodo vsi drugi razstavljeni, razen Kiryat Arbe (v bližini svetega mesta Hebron), ki bi bila izraelska enklava v palestinski državi in ​​bi bila z Izraelom povezana z obvozno cesto. Zahodni breg bi na sredini razdelila cesta, ki jo Izrael kontrolira od Jeruzalema do Mrtvega morja, s prostim prehodom za Palestince, čeprav si Izrael pridržuje pravico, da v nujnih primerih zapre cesto za prehod. Izrael bi v zameno Palestincem dovolil uporabo avtoceste v Negevu za povezavo Zahodnega brega z Gazo. Wright navaja, da bi bili v izraelskem predlogu Zahodni breg in Gaza povezani z dvignjeno avtocesto in dvignjeno železnico skozi Negev, kar bi Palestincem zagotovilo varen in prost prehod. Ti bi bili pod suverenostjo Izraela, Izrael pa si pridržuje pravico, da jih v nujnih primerih zapre. [12]

Izrael bi obdržal približno 9% na Zahodnem bregu v zameno za 1% zemljišča v zeleni črti. Dežela, ki bi bila dodeljena, je vključevala simbolična in kulturna ozemlja, kot je mošeja Al-Aqsa, medtem ko izraelska dežela ni bila določena. Poleg ozemeljskih koncesij bi palestinski zračni prostor nadzoroval Izrael na podlagi Barakove ponudbe. [12] [13] Palestinci so zavrnili peščeno območje Halutza (78 km 2) ob Gazi kot del zamenjave zemljišč, ker je bila slabše kakovosti od tiste, ki bi se ji morali odreči na Zahodnem bregu . [8]

Dodatni razlogi za zavrnitev so bili, da je izraelski predlog načrtoval priključitev območij, ki bi vodila do kantonizacije Zahodnega brega v tri bloke, kar je palestinska delegacija primerjala z južnoafriškimi Bantustani, kar je bilo izraženo pri izraelskih in ameriških pogajalcih. [14] Bloki naselij, obvožene ceste in priključena zemljišča bi ustvarili ovire med Nablusom in Jeninom z Ramalo. Blok Ramallah bi se nato ločil od Betlehema in Hebrona. Ločen in manjši blok bi vseboval Jeriho. Poleg tega bi bila meja med Zahodnim bregom in Jordanijo dodatno pod izraelskim nadzorom. Palestinske oblasti bi prejele žepe vzhodnega Jeruzalema, ki bi bile v celoti obdane s priključenimi deželami na Zahodnem bregu. [15]

Vzhodni Jeruzalem

Še posebej grozljiv teritorialni spor se je vrtel okoli končnega statusa Jeruzalema. Voditelji so bili slabo pripravljeni na osrednjo vlogo, ki jo bo imelo pri pogajanjih vprašanje Jeruzalema nasploh in zlasti spor o Tempeljski gori. [16] Barak je svojim delegatom naročil, naj spor obravnavajo kot "osrednje vprašanje, ki bo odločalo o usodi pogajanj", medtem ko je Arafat opozoril svojo delegacijo, naj se "pri tej stvari ne premakne: Haram (tempeljska gora) je bolj dragocen mene kot vse ostalo. " [17] Barak je ob odprtju Camp Davida Američane opozoril, da ne more sprejeti, da Palestincem dajo zgolj simbolično suverenost nad katerim koli delom vzhodnega Jeruzalema. [13]

Palestinci so zahtevali popolno suverenost nad Vzhodnim Jeruzalemom in njegovimi svetimi kraji, zlasti mošejo Al-Aqsa in Kupolo na skali, ki se nahajata na templju (Haram al-Sharif), ki je sveto v islamu in judovstvu , in razstavljanje vseh izraelskih sosesk, zgrajenih nad zeleno črto. Palestinsko stališče, po besedah ​​Mahmuda Abbasa, takratnega Arafatovega glavnega pogajalca, je bilo naslednje: "Ves vzhodni Jeruzalem je treba vrniti pod palestinsko suverenost. Judovsko četrt in Zahodni zid je treba dati pod izraelsko oblast, ne pa pod izraelsko suverenost. Odprto mesto in sodelovanje pri komunalnih storitvah. " [18]

Izrael je predlagal, da se Palestincem podeli "skrbništvo", čeprav ne suverenost, na tempeljskem gori (Haram al-Sharif), pri čemer naj Izrael ohrani nadzor nad Zahodnim zidom, ostankom starodavnega obzidja, ki je obdajalo tempeljsko goro, najbolj sveto mesto v judovstvu zunaj samega templja. Izraelski pogajalci so tudi predlagali, da se Palestincem podeli upravljanje muslimanske in krščanske četrti starega mesta, ne pa tudi suverenosti, pri čemer judovska in armenska četrt ostaneta v izraelskih rokah. [18] [19] [20] Palestinci bi dobili administrativni nadzor nad vsemi islamskimi in krščanskimi svetimi mesti in bi jim bilo dovoljeno dvigniti palestinsko zastavo. Palestinska država bi priključila prehod, ki povezuje severni Jeruzalem z islamskimi in krščanskimi svetimi mesti. Izraelska ekipa je predlagala priključitev izraelskih jeruzalemskih naselij na Zahodnem bregu onkraj zelene črte, kot so Ma'ale Adumim, Givat Ze'ev in Gush Etzion. Izrael je predlagal, da Palestinci združijo nekatere zunanje arabske vasi in majhna mesta, ki so bila priključena Jeruzalemu šele po letu 1967 (na primer Abu Dis, al-Eizariya, 'Anata, A-Ram in vzhodni Sawahre), da bi ustvarili mesto Al- Quds, ki bi služil kot glavno mesto Palestine. [20] Zgodovinsko pomembne arabske soseske, kot so šeik Jarrah, Silwan in at-Tur, bi ostale pod izraelsko suverenostjo, medtem ko bi imeli Palestinci samo civilno avtonomijo. Palestinci bi imeli civilno in upravno avtonomijo v zunanjih arabskih soseskah. Izraelske soseske v vzhodnem Jeruzalemu bi ostale pod izraelsko suverenostjo. [8] [19] Sveti kraji v starem mestnem jedru bi imeli neodvisno versko upravo. [21] Izrael je skupaj zahteval, da se palestinsko ozemlje v vzhodnem Jeruzalemu zmanjša na osem odsekov, vključno s šestimi majhnimi enklavami, je dejala palestinska delegacija na vrhu. [22]

Palestinci so nasprotovali pomanjkanju suverenosti in pravici Izraela, da ohrani judovske soseske, ki jih je zgradil nad zeleno črto v vzhodnem Jeruzalemu, za katero so Palestinci trdili, da blokira bližino arabskih sosesk v vzhodnem Jeruzalemu.

Begunci in pravica do vračanja

Zaradi prve arabsko-izraelske vojne je veliko palestinskih Arabcev pobegnilo ali jih izgnalo iz njihovih domov znotraj današnjega Izraela. Teh beguncev je bilo takrat približno 711.000 do 725.000. Danes skupaj z njihovimi potomci šteje približno štiri milijone, kar predstavlja približno polovico palestinskega ljudstva. Od takrat so Palestinci zahtevali popolno uveljavljanje pravice do vračanja, kar pomeni, da bi vsak begunec dobil možnost, da se vrne na svoj dom z obnovljenim premoženjem in prejme odškodnino. Izraelci so zatrjevali, da bi dovoljenje pravice do vrnitve v sam Izrael in ne v novonastalo palestinsko državo pomenilo priliv Palestincev, ki bi v osnovi spremenil demografijo Izraela, kar bi ogrozilo izraelski judovski značaj in njegov obstoj kot celoto.

Palestinci so v Camp Davidu ohranili svojo tradicionalno zahtevo po uveljavitvi pravice do vračanja. Zahtevali so, da Izrael prizna pravico vsem beguncem, ki so se tako želeli naseliti v Izraelu, vendar so ob upoštevanju izraelskih demografskih skrbi obljubili, da se bo pravica do vrnitve uveljavila z mehanizmom, o katerem sta se dogovorili obe strani, ki bo poskušal usmeriti večina beguncev nima možnosti vrnitve v Izrael. [23] Po mnenju ameriške državne sekretarke Madeleine Albright so bili nekateri palestinski pogajalci pripravljeni zasebno razpravljati o omejitvi števila beguncev, ki bi se jim lahko vrnilo v Izrael. [24] Palestinci, ki so se odločili vrniti v Izrael, bodo to storili postopoma, saj bo Izrael vsako leto absorbiral 150.000 beguncev.

Izraelski pogajalci so zanikali, da je Izrael odgovoren za problem beguncev, in so bili zaskrbljeni, da bi vsaka pravica do vrnitve ogrozila judovski značaj Izraela. V izraelskem predlogu bi se lahko največ 100.000 beguncev vrnilo v Izrael na podlagi humanitarnih razlogov ali združitve družine. Vsi drugi ljudje, ki so uvrščeni med palestinske begunce, bi bili naseljeni v svojem trenutnem kraju bivanja, palestinski državi ali tretjih državah. Izrael bi pomagal financirati njihovo naselitev in absorpcijo. Ustanovljen bi bil mednarodni sklad v višini 30 milijard dolarjev, ki bi ga Izrael skupaj z drugimi državami prispeval k registraciji zahtevkov za odškodnino za premoženje, ki so ga izgubili palestinski begunci, in plačeval v mejah svojih sredstev. [25]

Varnostni dogovori

Izraelski pogajalci so predlagali, da se Izraelu dovoli, da v palestinski državi postavi radarske postaje in uporabi njegov zračni prostor. Izrael je prav tako želel pravico do napotitve vojakov na palestinsko ozemlje v primeru izrednih razmer in namestitev mednarodnih sil v dolino Jordana. Palestinske oblasti bi ohranile nadzor nad mejnimi prehodi pod začasnim izraelskim nadzorom. Izrael bi ohranil stalno varnostno prisotnost vzdolž 15% palestinsko-jordanske meje. [26] Izrael je prav tako zahteval demilitarizacijo palestinske države, razen njenih paravojaških varnostnih sil, da ne bi sklenil zavezništev brez izraelskega dovoljenja ali dovolil uvedbe tujih sil zahodno od reke Jordan in da bi razbil teroristične skupine. [27] Ena najmočnejših zahtev Izraela je bila, da Arafat razglasi konflikt končan in ne zahteva več nobenih zahtev. Izrael je tudi želel, da si vodne vire na Zahodnem bregu delita obe strani in ostaneta pod izraelskim upravljanjem.

Sredi oktobra sta Clinton in pogodbenici na vrhu v Sharm El Sheikhu prišli do "sharmskega memoranduma" z razumevanjem, namenjenim prekinitvi nasilja in obnovi varnostnega sodelovanja. Od 18. do 23. decembra so potekala pogajanja, nato pa je Clintonova predstavila svoje "parametre" v zadnjem poskusu doseči mir na Bližnjem vzhodu, preden se je njegov drugi mandat iztekel januarja 2001. [28] Čeprav je bilo v uradnih izjavah navedeno, da sta obe strani so s pridržki sprejeli Clintonove parametre [29], ti pridržki so dejansko pomenili, da so stranke zavrnile parametre na nekaterih bistvenih točkah. 2. januarja 2001 so Palestinci sprejeli nekaj temeljnih ugovorov. Barak je sprejel parametre z 20-stranskim pridržkom. [30] Vrh v Sharm el-Sheikhu, načrtovan za 28. december, ni potekal.

Clintonova pobuda je januarja 2001 privedla do pogajanj o Tabi, kjer sta obe strani objavili izjavo, v kateri sta zapisali, da nikoli nista bili bližje sporazumu (čeprav so vprašanja, kot sta Jeruzalem, status Gaze in palestinska zahteva po odškodninah za begunce in njihove potomce, ostala nerešeno), vendar je Barak, ki se sooča z volitvami, pogovore znova prekinil. [31] Ehuda Baraka naj bi leta 2001 premagal Ariel Sharon.

Obtožbe palestinske odgovornosti

Večina izraelskih in ameriških kritik zaradi neuspeha vrha v Camp Davidu leta 2000 je bila izrečena na Arafatu. [32] [33] Ehud Barak prikazuje Arafatovo vedenje v Camp Davidu kot "nastop, namenjen iskanju čim več izraelskih popuščanj, ne da bi kdaj resno nameraval doseči mirovno rešitev ali podpisati" konec spora. [19]

Clinton je po neuspehu pogovorov obtožil Arafata in dejal: "Obžalujem, da je Arafat leta 2000 zamudil priložnost, da bi ta narod zaživel in molil za dan, ko se bodo uresničile sanje palestinskega ljudstva o državi in ​​boljšem življenju v pravičnem in trajnem miru. " Nesporazum je bil v veliki meri pripisan Yasserju Arafatu, ko se je odpravil od mize, ne da bi dal konkretno nasprotno ponudbo, in ker Arafat ni storil ničesar, da bi zadušil niz palestinskih nemirov, ki so se začeli kmalu po vrhu. [33] [34] [35] Arafata je tudi Nebil Amr, nekdanji minister v palestinskih obtožnicah, obtožil, da je pogajal. [36] V Moje življenje, Clinton je zapisal, da je Arafat nekoč pohvalil Clintona, ko mu je rekel: "Ti si odličen človek." Clinton je odgovoril: "Nisem odličen človek. Jaz sem neuspeh in ti si me naredil." [37]

Dennis Ross, odposlanec ZDA za Bližnji vzhod in ključni pogajalec na vrhu, je v svoji knjigi povzel svoje poglede Manjkajoči mir. Med predavanjem v Avstraliji je Ross namigoval, da je razlog za neuspeh Arafatova nepripravljenost, da podpiše končni dogovor z Izraelom, ki bi zaprl vrata vsem največjim zahtevam Palestincev, zlasti pravici do vračanja. Ross je trdil, da je Arafat v resnici želel "rešitev ene države. Ne neodvisnih, sosednjih izraelskih in palestinskih držav, ampak eno samo arabsko državo, ki zajema vso zgodovinsko Palestino". [38] Ross je med pogajanji citiral tudi savdskega princa Bandarja: "Če Arafat ne sprejme tega, kar je zdaj na voljo, to ne bo tragedija, ampak bo zločin." [39]

V svoji knjigi je Oslov sindrom, Profesor psihiatrije in zgodovinar z medicinske šole na Harvardu [40] Kenneth Levin je na ta način povzel neuspeh vrha v Camp Davidu leta 2000: "kljub razsežnosti izraelske ponudbe in močnemu pritisku predsednika Clintona je Arafat zanikal. Očitno res ni hotel , ne glede na izraelske koncesije, podpisati sporazum, ki se je razglasil za dokončnega in zavračal vse nadaljnje palestinske zahtevke. " [34] Levin trdi, da so bili Izraelci in Američani naivni v pričakovanju, da se bo Arafat strinjal, da se bo odrekel ideji o dobesedni "pravici do vračanja" za vse Palestince v Izrael, ne glede na to, koliko beguncev iz leta 1948 ali koliko denarne odškodnine Izrael je ponudil dovoljenje.

Alan Dershowitz, izraelski zagovornik in profesor prava na univerzi Harvard, je dejal, da je do neuspeha pogajanj prišlo zaradi "zavrnitve Palestincev in Arafata, da bi se odrekli pravici do vračanja. To je bila prelomnica. Jeruzalem. To niso bile meje. To je bila pravica do vrnitve. " Trdil je, da mu je predsednik Clinton to povedal "neposredno in osebno". [41]

Obtožbe izraelske in ameriške odgovornosti

Leta 2001 je Robert Malley, navzoč na vrhu, opozoril na tri "mite", ki so nastali glede neuspeha pogajanj. To so bili: "Camp David je bil idealen preizkus namenov gospoda Arafata", "Izraelska ponudba je izpolnila večino, če ne celo vse legitimne težnje Palestincev", in "Palestinci niso popuščali sami" in napisali: "Če je mir da bi jih dosegli, si stranke ne morejo privoščiti, da bi sprejele te mite kot resničnost. " [42]

Izraelska skupina Gush Shalom je izjavila, da je "ponudba pretvarjanje v velikodušnost v dobrobit medijev", in vključila podrobne zemljevide, kaj ponudba konkretno vključuje. [43] [ nezanesljiv vir? ] Med zaskrbljenostjo Gusha Shaloma glede Barakove ponudbe je bila Barakova zahteva po priključitvi velikih poravnalnih blokov (9% Zahodnega brega), pomanjkanje zaupanja v zavezo in/ali sposobnost izraelske vlade, da evakuira na tisoče izraelskih naseljencev, ki niso iz bloka. 15-letni časovni okvir in omejena suverenost Palestincev v Jeruzalemu.

Clayton Swisher je v svoji knjigi iz leta 2004 napisal zavrnitev Clintonovih in Rossovih poročil o vzrokih za razpad vrha v Camp Davidu, Resnica o Camp Davidu. [44] Swisher, direktor programov na inštitutu za Bližnji vzhod, je sklenil, da so Izraelci in Američani za propad vsaj tako krivi kot Palestinci. MJ Rosenberg je knjigo pohvalil: "Clayton Swisherjeva" Resnica o Camp Davidu ", ki temelji na intervjujih z [ameriškimi pogajalci] Martinom Indykom, Dennisom Rossom in [Aaronom] Millerjem, ponuja izčrpen in natančen opis - najboljše, kar bomo verjetno glej-o [enostranski diplomaciji] Miller opisuje. " [45]

Shlomo Ben-Ami, takratni izraelski minister za zunanje odnose, ki je sodeloval v pogovorih, je izjavil, da Palestinci želijo takojšen umik Izraelcev z Zahodnega brega, Gaze in vzhodnega Jeruzalema, nato pa bodo palestinske oblasti razbile palestinske organizacije . Izraelski odgovor je bil "ne moremo sprejeti zahteve po vrnitvi na meje junija 1967 kot predpogoj za pogajanja." [46] Leta 2006 je Shlomo Ben-Ami izjavil o Democracy Now! da "Camp David ni bil zamujena priložnost za Palestince, in če bi bil Palestinec, bi tudi Camp David zavrnil. To je nekaj, kar sem zapisal v knjigi. Toda problem je Taba. Clintonovi parametri so problem "sklicuje se na njegovo knjigo iz leta 2001 Brazgotine vojne, rane miru: izraelsko-arabska tragedija. [47]

Norman Finkelstein je v zimski številki leta 2007 objavil članek Journal of Palestine Studies, odlomek iz njegovega daljšega eseja Podrejanje palestinskih pravic izraelskim "potrebam". Povzetek za članek navaja: "Zlasti preučuje predpostavke, ki poročajo o Rossovem poročilu o tem, kaj se je zgodilo med pogajanji in zakaj, ter izkrivljanja, ki izhajajo iz teh predpostavk. Sodnik z vidika ustreznih pravic Palestincev in Izraelcev po mednarodnih po zakonu so vse koncesije pri Camp Davidu prišle s palestinske strani, nobena z izraelske strani. " [48]

Profesor politologije v Berkeleyju Ron Hassner je trdil, da je neuspeh udeležencev pogajanj, da bi v postopek vključili verske voditelje ali se celo posvetovali z verskimi strokovnjaki, privedel do propada pogajanj o temi Jeruzalem. "Zdi se, da sta obe strani domnevali, da je mogoče zanemariti verske razsežnosti spora. Posledično se nobena stran ni resno pripravila na možnost, da bo vprašanje templja prišlo v središče pogajanj." [16] Politolog Menahem Klein, ki je med pogajanji svetoval izraelski vladi, je potrdil, da "poklicni hrbtni kanali niso dovolj obravnavali Jeruzalema kot verskega mesta. Lažje je bilo razpravljati o ohranjanju zgodovinskih struktur v starem mestu kot razpravljati o povezavi med politično svetostjo in versko svetostjo v zgodovinskem in verskem središču mesta. " [49]

Palestinska javnost je podpirala vlogo Arafata v pogajanjih. After the summit, Arafat's approval rating increased seven percentage points from 39 to 46%. [50] Overall, 68% of the Palestinian public thought Arafat's positions on a final agreement at Camp David were just right and 14% thought Arafat compromised too much while only 6% thought Arafat had not compromised enough. [50]

Barak did not fare as well in public opinion polls. Only 25% of the Israeli public thought his positions on Camp David were just right as opposed to 58% of the public that thought Barak compromised too much. [51] A majority of Israelis were opposed to Barak's position on every issue discussed at Camp David except for security. [52]

President William J. Clinton
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat


Presidents Anwar Sadat, Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister Begin at Camp David, 9 January 1978. GPO.

AUTHOR

Opcije

Gerald M. Steinberg, Bar Ilan University and Ziv Rubinovitz, Sonoma State University are the authors od Menachem Begin and the Israel-Egypt Peace Process: Between Ideology and Political Realism (Indiana University Press, 2019), based on newly released Israeli documentation of the negotiations that led to the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. The documents, they claim, cast a new light on the actions of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, a man framed by US President Jimmy Carter as a ‘reluctant peacemaker’.

The Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement of 1979 remains a unique accomplishment, not only in the otherwise bleak landscape of the Middle East, but throughout the world. Forty years after the leaders of Israel and Egypt, with the support of the US, signed the treaty, its terms continues to serve as the basis for stability and cooperation between the two nations. Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Anwar Sadat achieved what many thought was impossible. Building on limited disengagement agreements following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, they overcame mutual suspicions and internal opposition.

In order to learn and build on the lessons from this successful example of international conflict resolution, it is important to examine and understand the details, and to distinguish between the record, as reflected in the available documentation, and the less substantiated and second-hand accounts.

In particular, the recent release of official Israeli documents, including transcripts of meetings during the Camp David summit of September 1978, as well as official diplomatic cables, and the internal assessments made throughout the process provide important new insights. Through these documents we can gain a much sharper understanding of, and insight into, the perspectives and considerations of Begin, who, in contrast to other central actors – Americans, other Israelis, and, to a lesser extent, Egyptians – did not publish a memoir or provide extensive interviews.

On many of the key issues, the Israeli documents reinforce the existing analysis. The background of the very costly 1973 Yom Kippur war, which ended with a ‘mutually hurting stalemate,’ triggered the search for a solution which would meet the core interests of Egypt and Israel, and prevent another and probably more destructive round of warfare. The two limited disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975 were also important confidence-building measures, and were followed by various signals from Sadat to Israeli leaders regarding additional steps.

The Israeli elections that took place in May 1977, and the political ‘earthquake’ in which the Likud took power, headed by Begin, was a major turning point. As the documents illustrate, from his first day in office, Begin gave the highest priority to the possibility of reaching a peace agreement with Egypt. He immediately familiarised himself with the issues, and understood that Sadat sought to recover the Sinai Peninsula, and Egyptian pride, both lost in the 1967 Six-Day War, but without risking another war. His decision to appoint Moshe Dayan as foreign minister, despite Dayan’s membership in opposing political parties, was also closely linked to this objective.

Indeed, Begin’s words and actions throughout the process highlight the emphasis he placed on reaching an agreement, in sharp contrast to the distorted images in some of the existing analyses, particularly from US President Jimmy Carter, that portray the Israeli prime minister as a ‘reluctant peacemaker’, a ‘right-wing ideologue’ or, after the Camp David accords, as having ‘buyers’ remorse’, as Ambassador Sam Lewis suggested. A number of these distortions are repeated by Carter’s Middle East advisor, William Quandt in his recent article in the Cairo Review of Global Affairs , (‘Reflections on Camp David at 40’, December 2018).

Similarly, the previous accounts generally ignored the complexities of Israeli politics and, like many American officials, mistakenly viewed Begin as if he held a position equivalent to the US president, rather than as the leader of a fragile coalition often under attack from his core constituents. The Israeli documentation allows for a more robust analysis, based on two-dimensional negotiation models – the external realm and the internal one. For some of Begin’s long-time supporters in Herut, his willingness to remove the settlements in the Sinai and agree to even a minimal form of autonomy in the West Bank was treasonous, and a number of ministers resigned in protest. This criticism was shared by hawkish members of the Labour opposition, increasing the political pressure on Begin, who, it should be recalled, had taken office only one year earlier. Pressures from Carter and Sadat for more concessions, particularly on the Palestinian issue, were domestically untenable.

In tracing the evolution of Begin’s efforts to reconcile the opposing pulls of ideology and political realism, his stint as a member of the National Unity Government created just prior to the June 1967 war provides important milestones. After the ceasefire, the cabinet, led by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, endorsed the land-for-peace formula for Egypt and Syria, and Begin – based on his understanding of political realism and the Israeli national interest – joined in approving this framework. He repeated this position on numerous occasions, emphasising the importance of a full treaty, as distinct from partial agreements such as non-belligerency, which, he argued, would not bring Israel the full legitimacy that was required. In 1970, Begin resigned from the cabinet and returned to lead the opposition, citing the government’s acceptance of the Rogers Plan, which ended the War of Attrition and included UN Security Resolution 242 as the basis for further negotiations.

Seven years later, as Prime Minister, Begin embraced the opportunity to implement his policies, starting with briefings on the details of Sadat’s visit to Romania. After Begin went to Washington to meet President Carter to discuss peace options (the meeting summaries reflect major disagreements), Begin traveled to Romania, and, in parallel, sent Mossad head Yitzhak Hofi to Morocco (later, joined by Dayan) for secret meetings with one of Sadat’s closest aides, Hassan Tuhami.

In the midst of these activities, the US was working on a parallel track based on the Geneva conference concept, expanding on the stillborn framework that Henry Kissinger tried in December 1973. In many of the analyses of the peace process that were published previously, and particularly in the American versions, the catalysing impact of the push towards Geneva on Begin and Sadat is omitted. In particular, Carter’s effort to involve the Soviet Union alienated both leaders, who made common cause in going around Carter. Sadat had recently evicted the Soviet military from Egypt, and Begin’s experience as a prisoner in the Gulag left a lifelong hostility – both viewed Moscow’s potential role as entirely anathema. The two leaders were also concerned that the American effort to solve the entire Middle East conflict, which included bringing in Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Syrian President Hafez Assad, as outlined in a plan published by the Brookings Institution, would fail and also prevent realisation of a bilateral peace agreement.

Based on these shared interests, Sadat made a number of public statements referring to a potential visit to Israel, and Begin used back channels, including through US embassies in Tel Aviv and Cairo, to send positive replies. These events set the stage for Sadat’s dramatic Saturday night arrival in Tel Aviv in November 1977, which set the formal public process in motion. For Israelis, the appearance of the Egyptian leader sent a powerful signal of acceptance, and created the expectation that a peace agreement was possible.

After the euphoria of the initial visit, however, the negotiation of the detailed terms turned out, not surprisingly, to be slow and difficult. Two sets of issues were simultaneously on the table. First came the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli peace, such as borders, the fate of the settlements in Sinai, and security arrangements. To help resolve the complexities and provide security as well as financial guarantees, it was necessary to bring Carter and the Americans back into the negotiations, as seen at the pivotal Camp David Summit in September 1978.

The summit ended in success, with agreement on many of the core issues, but regarding the process, much of what has been written needs revising in the wake of the Israeli documents. While Carter and the Americans emphasised psychological dimensions, describing Begin as a stubborn and legalistic quibbler, and Sadat as temperamental and prone to sweeping generalities, and separated them after the third day, these were largely irrelevant. Instead, the concentrated negotiations that took place during this two-week period focused largely on interests and trade-offs. The Egyptians agreed to the Israeli demands for demilitarisation, a monitoring framework for the Sinai, and a full peace treaty, including the exchange of ambassadors, as well as transport lines, and cultural, touristic, and academic exchanges.

In return, Begin acceded to the removal of the Israeli presence – military as well as civilian – from the Sinai, becoming the first leader in the history of Israel and Zionism to take down settlements. His closest friends and allies were livid, calling him a traitor, which was very painful, and required Begin to use significant political resources in order to stem the revolt.

But as a realist, the Israeli leader recognised the core Israeli interest in a peace treaty with Egypt, and to reach this goal, he would have to pay the cost. He understood that there was no alternative – Sadat was not going to accept anything less than a full Israeli withdrawal in exchange for a full peace agreement. This was the Egyptian position from the first talks between Dayan and Tuhami in Morocco, and Begin had enough time to prepare, once Sadat accepted Begin’s core security and diplomatic requirements.

The second and more complex dimension involved the Palestinians and the future of the West Bank. During the second week of Camp David, and much of the ensuing six months until the signing of the treaty, talks focused on these issues. Sadat, and to a greater degree Carter, demanded that the Egyptian-Israel treaty be linked to an agreement on the West Bank. Carter continued to press for the ‘Palestinian homeland’ that laid at the core of the Brookings Institute plan, and sought to force Begin to expand his limited autonomy plan so that it would lead to this result.

This is where Begin’s ideological commitment was not flexible, and he repeatedly told Carter, as well as his Israeli constituents, that no foreign sovereignty in any part of Eretz Israel would be acceptable. For the sake of peace, he accepted the need for Palestinian self-rule on domestic issues, while leaving Israel responsible for security and foreign policy. During and after Camp David, Sadat acquiesced to the limits that Begin presented regarding the West Bank, but Carter maintained and even increased the pressure. The challenge for Begin was to avoid a total rift with the president of the US, despite threats to blame Israel for the failure of the peace effort. In their intense meeting on the last night of the Camp David talks, Carter insisted that Begin agree to a long freeze on settlement construction on the West Bank – a demand that the US had made repeatedly and which Begin repeatedly rejected. According to Carter, this time, Begin agreed and promised to provide a letter in the morning to verify a five-year moratorium. When Begin’s letter referred to three months (until the expected signing of the peace treaty with Egypt), Carter was livid and accused Begin of backtracking. However, the Israeli notes from this meeting (there is no American summary) as well as later a Senate testimony from Secretary of State Vance corroborate Begin’s version.

It took six months after Camp David to turn the accords into a treaty, in part due to Carter’s ongoing effort to force Begin to change his policies over the West Bank, but the terms were finally agreed and signed on 26 March 1979. This was a stellar achievement for which all three leaders deserve credit, and counter to pessimistic predictions of many Israelis, the agreement has withstood numerous crises.

Lessons to be learned

Moving forward, not only in the Middle East but also in attempting to apply the lessons to other protracted international conflict, an accurate examination of the negotiation record is essential. Success requires leaders who see peace as a national priority and are willing to take prudent risks in order to achieve this objective. Such leaders and the interests that they share cannot be produced artificially or through outside pressure, and in their absence, efforts to reach agreements have no chance. In Sadat, Begin had a partner who recognised this, and obratno, and on this basis, they explored the possibilities for agreement.

Once these starting conditions are in place, third parties and mediators can provide vital support, but they must avoid piling on additional demands beyond what the core actors and their political support systems are able to accept. It is important to assess the domestic political constraints of each of the parties, and work within those constraints in order to facilitate an agreement. This rare instance of successful international negotiations demonstrated the importance of staying within the boundaries of political realism. Thus, while the US imagined the benefits of a comprehensive agreement involving the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Syria regime, Begin and Sadat recognised the obstacles that that would create with respect to the bilateral process. Begin’s position on the Palestinians was anchored in immovable ideology, and not due to a ‘recalcitrant personality’ or other psychological factors.

Finally, with the addition of the perspectives provided by the Israeli documents, and, in particular, Begin’s careful management of the Israeli negotiating position, it is possible to better understand the factors that led to the successful outcome. For those who hope to follow Begin and Sadat, or for third parties that seek to bring other leaders of countries involved in violent conflicts to the negotiating table, it is necessary to examine the interests, benefits and potential risks from the perspectives of all the actors. After 40 years, the Israeli dimension of these complex events can now be analysed in detail.


Review: Lawrence Wright’s new book vividly recalls 1978 Camp David summit

There’s an air of tragedy hovering over Lawrence Wright’s excellent new book on the 1978 peace negotiations at Camp David, presided over by then-President Jimmy Carter.

During those fateful autumn days, the world watched as three world leaders — Christian, Jewish and Muslim — shook hands at the White House after reaching an agreement to end three decades of war. Every reader of Wright’s book, however, will know what’s coming in the book’s epilogue — the promise of peace in the Middle East was fleeting and ultimately proved false.

Wright is the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of many books, including a widely praised history of the Church of Scientology. “Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David” is his exceedingly balanced, highly readable and appropriately sober look at the peace talks that unfolded at the wooded military base in Maryland.

The agreement Carter brokered between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was the crowning achievement of his otherwise disappointing presidency. Sadat and Begin later were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But Wright’s book is no paean to the leaders.

Instead, he casts a critical and honest eye upon the three men. Much of “Thirteen Days” details the fractured personal and public histories that brought Carter, Begin and Sadat to power and eventually to Camp David. And it portrays the negotiations themselves as a tense series of meetings between powerful men who whined, pouted and screamed to get their way.

For nearly two weeks, the three leaders and their many advisers lived in the forced intimacy of the Camp David cabins. For most of the time they were there, the leaders and their entourages sat around and sulked. It didn’t take long for several delegates to ask to be freed from “this cursed prison.”

On the surface, Begin and Sadat had little in common. But earlier in their careers both had been prisoners of the British colonial authorities. Both had fought — often viciously — for the independence of their countries. Wright doesn’t spare showing us the blood they had on their hands.

As a young Egyptian nationalist during World War II, Sadat joined a “murder society” that assassinated isolated British soldiers and later targeted Egyptian leaders who collaborated with British colonial authorities.

Begin was a Zionist from a young age. In 1929, he joined a paramilitary Jewish youth group in Poland. He lost most of his family in the Holocaust. In Palestine, he became among the fiercest of the rebels fighting the British for the creation of a Jewish state. He used tactics that would later come to be branded “terrorism.”

“The transformation of terrorism as a primarily local phenomenon into a global one came about in large part because of the success of his tactics,” Wright writes of Begin. “He proved that, under the right circumstances, terror works.”

Next to Begin and Sadat, Carter’s political career was sedate and provincial. A peanut farmer and former naval officer, he rose to power as a moderate on racial issues in a Southern state emerging from the violence and confrontation of segregation. Carter was also a pious man with a lifelong fascination with the Holy Land. With the U.S. in a deep economic and cultural funk, he staked his political future on the summit.

He brought the leaders to a mountain camp first made an official presidential getaway by Franklin Roosevelt. Carter said, “I don’t believe anyone could stay in this place, close to nature, peaceful and isolated from the world, and still carry a grudge.” As Wright points out, Carter would soon come to see the “naïveté" of that statement.

Carter wanted a comprehensive peace that would resolve the fate of the stateless, occupied Palestinian Arabs. But that dream was doomed even before the summit, since the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the state of Israel refused to recognize each other’s existence.

Sadat had helped set a peace process in motion with a surprise visit to Jerusalem in 1977. By agreeing to Carter’s Camp David gambit, he hoped that Egypt might displace Israel as the Americans’ key ally in the region. Begin was convinced the talks would fail — he was the only one of the three leaders to arrive at the summit without any proposals.

Carter hoped the opposing camps would warm to each other in an informal setting complete with bicycles and jogging paths. But as Wright points out, many in the two delegations had faced off against each other in one or more of the four wars the Israelis and Arabs had fought over the previous three decades.

For the Arabs, the support of Western powers for Israel had left them convinced that “Israel had been created not as a homeland for persecuted Jews but as a base for Western imperialists to maintain their stranglehold on the Middle East.” All those wars had left Israel as the region’s most powerful country, but also one surrounded by enemies.

As a condition for recognizing Israel, Sadat demanded that Begin return the Sinai Peninsula. Begin said such a deal would mean giving away a buffer zone of deserts and mountains in exchange for a mere written promise. Given Begin’s own experiences with loss and betrayal, it was a difficult bargain to make.

“There was only one thing standing in the way, and that was Begin’s entire history,” Wright says.

Wright describes Carter’s efforts to break the deadlock, including an excursion with both sets of delegates to the battlefield at nearby Gettysburg, as a reminder of “the fateful consequences of a failure at Camp David.” Eventually, Carter made the decision to push for a limited agreement between Israel and Egypt, leaving the fate of Jerusalem and the Palestinians unsettled.

Sadat’s own foreign minister warned that such an agreement would be “ruinous” to Egypt and would “add fuel to the fire” by leaving Israel with free rein in the West Bank. Israel’s position was strengthened even more by a diplomatic misunderstanding on the final, exhausting night of the summit.

When the treaty was finally signed, Egypt had effectively severed its links to the Palestinian cause, Wright says. Without “a powerful Arab champion, Palestine became a mascot for Islamists and radical factions.”

But the final outcome was not entirely a disaster. As Wright points out, there has not been a single violation of the agreement in the 35 years since. Even as endless battles rage nearby, Egypt and Israel remain at peace with each other.

Follow me on Twitter: @tobarwriter

Thirteen Days in September
Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David

Lawrence Wright
Alfred A. Knopf: 368 pp., $27.95

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Hector Tobar worked at the Los Angeles Times for two decades: as a city reporter, national and foreign correspondent, columnist and with the books and culture department. He left in September 2014. Tobar was The Times’ bureau chief in Mexico City and Buenos Aires and was part of the reporting team that won a Pulitzer Prize for coverage of the 1992 L.A. riots. He has also worked as features editor at the LA Weekly and as editor of the bilingual San Francisco magazine El Tecolote. Tobar has an MFA in creative writing from UC Irvine and studied at UC Santa Cruz and at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico in Mexico City. The Los Angeles-born writer is the author of five books, which have been translated into 15 languages. His novel “The Barbarian Nurseries” was named a New York Times Notable Book in 2011 and also won the California Book Award Gold Medal for Fiction his latest work is “The Last Great Road Bum.” He’s married, the father of three children and the son of Guatemalan immigrants.

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U.S.-brokered peace deals across the years

One role American presidents and their secretaries of state and envoys often have played with great success is helping bring peace to fractured parts of the world.

Three sitting presidents, five current or former secretaries of state, a former president and a former vice president are among the 21 Americans who have won Nobel Peace Prizes for their efforts.

Here is a look at celebrated deals they brokered:

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)

Secretary of State Colin Powell (left) joins leaders of Sudan’s government and rebels in signing the 2005 accord. (© Thomas Mukoya/Reuters)

The pact between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement ended Africa’s longest civil war and laid the groundwork for the 2011 referendum that gave South Sudan its independence. The United States played an important role in the negotiations, with Secretary of State Colin Powell among the principal signatories.

Good Friday Agreement (1998)

Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell receives a round of applause at a 1998 ceremony in Boston honoring him and Northern Ireland leaders for the Good Friday Agreement that ended three decades of sectarian strife in Ulster. (© Elise Amendola/AP Images)

Longstanding enmity between Northern Ireland’s Protestant majority and Catholic minority erupted into strife in 1968. The conflict, which lasted three decades, was regarded as one of the world’s most intractable ethnic disputes. But the Good Friday Agreement signed in 1998 brought durable peace to the divided province of Ulster. U.S. Special Envoy and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell crafted the ground rules in 1996 that brought the disputants to the table and shuttled between Washington and Belfast to close the deal.

The Dayton Accords (1995)

President Bill Clinton (standing, second from left) and European leaders applaud as Balkan leaders Presidents Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina sign the 1995 accords that ended the Bosnian War. (© Jerome Delay/AP Images)

The Dayton Accords signed by Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 ended the war in Bosnia that claimed over 200,000 lives. American diplomat Richard Holbrooke was the chief negotiator for the agreement hammered out at a peace conference in Dayton, Ohio, led by Secretary of State Warren Christopher and leaders of Europe and Russia.

Camp David Accords (1978)

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin meeting at Camp David, Maryland, on September 6, 1978. Sadat and Begin did not meet again during the 13-day summit Carter went back and forth between them with new positions. (White House/AP Images)

The historic peace treaty that Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin signed at the White House on March 26, 1979, ended the 30-year state of war between the Middle East neighbors. The treaty brought to fruition the Camp David Accords agreed upon in September 1978. President Jimmy Carter brought Sadat and Begin to the presidential retreat in Maryland’s Catoctin Mountains and served as the go-between for the 13-day summit. Sadat and Begin were awarded the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize.

A Nobel Peace Prize for Arbitrating Conflicts (1912)

Elihu Root first served as secretary of war at the 20th century’s turn, but then won renown as secretary of state for concluding treaties and convincing other nations to arbitrate disputes. (© Buyenlarge/Getty Images)

Two years before the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Bosnia ignited World War I, former Secretary of State and Senator Elihu Root won a Nobel Peace Prize for his determined efforts to convince states to resolve disputes by arbitration instead of arms. Root negotiated arbitration treaties with 24 nations, helped France and Germany settle differences in Morocco, and resolved Alaska boundary and Atlantic fisheries disputes with Canada.

Treaty of Portsmouth (1905)

President Theodore Roosevelt (center) in a postcard celebrating the 1905 Portsmouth Peace Treaty that ended the Russo-Japanese War (© Buyenlarge/Getty Images)

President Theodore Roosevelt won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his role in bringing the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 to an end. The two countries battled on land and sea over control of parts of Manchuria, Korea and Sakhalin Island. The disputants met at a naval station in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, at Roosevelt’s invitation to help bridge their differences.


What to know about presidential retreat Camp David where Trump travels Friday

— -- President Donald Trump is headed back to the rustic presidential retreat Camp David for the weekend, this time joined by his Cabinet members. They'll likely discuss preparations for Hurricane Irma and the growing threat from North Korea.

Trump’s return to Camp David marks his fourth trip to the retreat, which has been the site of many historic discussions and private meetings between presidents and foreign dignitaries.

Trump's first visit was Father’s Day weekend in June with First Lady Melania Trump, their 11-year old son Barron and the first lady’s parents. The president spent a day there on Aug. 18 with his national security team, along with Defense Secretary James Mattis and Vice President Mike Pence, hashing out the administration's South Asia, or Afghanistan, strategy. The weekend of August 26-27, Trump monitored Hurricane Harvey from Camp David as the storm hit Texas.

Camp David, located in the Catoctin Mountain Park in Frederick County, Maryland, has played a prominent role in many presidential administrations, for both diplomatic meetings and personal vacations. The retreat is also an active military installation. Camp David is only a 30-minute helicopter ride from the White House. It is inaccessible to the public.

History of the camp

The camp was originally called Hi-Catoctin by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) prior to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps transforming it into a military installation.

WPA built the recreational area between 1936-1939 and federal employees used it for family camps. President Franklin Roosevelt first visited the camp in April 1942, after which it was chosen as the country location for presidential retreats. He renamed it “Shangri-la,” based on the fictional Himalayan paradise in James Milton’s 1933 novel “Lost Horizon.”

President Dwight Eisenhower renamed the site Camp David during his first visit in honor of his grandson, David.

Eisenhower also named the main president’s lounge “Aspen” in honor of the first lady, Mamie Eisenhower, who grew up in Colorado. The retreat boasts bedrooms, a small office, fireplaces, an outdoor flagstone patio, a heated swimming pool and a single golf hole with multiple tees.

How former presidents used the camp

Roosevelt started the tradition of hosting foreign leaders at the camp by inviting Sir Winston Churchill in 1943 at the height of World War II to review plans for the Allied invasion of Normandy. Roosevelt was photographed fishing with Churchill at a creek near the camp, and Churchill remarked that “no fish were caught” but Roosevelt “seemed to enjoy it very much, and was in great spirits”, according to Churchill’s “War Memoirs.”

Eisenhower visited the retreat frequently and added a bomb shelter, the golf course and several golf tees, as the Eisenhower archives note. Eisenhower was the first president to travel to Camp David from Washington, D.C., by helicopter, which greatly reduced the commute. He held meetings with his Cabinet and National Security Council at the retreat while recovering from a heart attack in 1955.

In 1959, in the midst of the Cold War, Eisenhower hosted the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev was suspicious of the site, calling it initially where “stray dogs went to die.” They had two days of meetings about the Cold War, after which the two leaders released a joint statement agreeing to reopen talks. However, shortly after the Soviets shot down an American spy plane, Eisenhower’s Soviet Union trip was scrapped.

Foreign affairs brought Eisenhower back to Camp David again in 1961 when he met then-President John F. Kennedy to review the failed Bay of Pigs military invasion of Cuba.

In 1978, then-president Jimmy Carter hosted Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David. Their 13 days of meetings led to a peace agreement known as the Camp David Accords, a major step in curbing years of conflict between Egypt and Israel, according to the State Department’s Office of the Historian. Sadat and Begin were both awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as a result of the agreement.

In the midst of the energy crisis in 1979, Carter traveled to Camp David for a series of secret meetings over the course of ten days, according to the Carter Center. After leaving the camp, Carter delivered his famed “malaise speech” in which he discussed problems facing the country, including a “crisis of confidence.”

“I invited to Camp David people from almost every segment of our society -- business and labor, teachers and preachers, Governors, mayors, and private citizens,” Carter said in the address.

Former president Ronald Reagan hosted prominent foreign leaders including Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone at Camp David, according to Reagan’s presidential library archives. Reagan reportedly loved the camp, and particularly enjoyed riding horses with his family at the retreat.

In her memoir, "My Turn," former first lady Nancy Reagan described how Camp David “gave her a tremendous feeling of release” and helped her and the president “get their thoughts in order.”


Poglej si posnetek: Israeli Prime Minister Begins remarks at the Camp David Agreement, 17 September 1978